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The file system becomes the usual target of malicious attacks because it contains lots of
sensitive data, such as executable programs, configuration and authorization information.
File integrity monitoring is an effective approach to discover aggressive behavior by
detecting modification actions on these sensitive files. Traditional real-time integrity
monitoring tools, which insert hooks into the OS kernel, are easily controlled and disabled
by malicious software. Such existing methods, which insert kernel module into OS, are
hard to be compatible because of the diversity of OS. In this paper, we present a non-
intrusive real-time file integrity monitoring method in virtual machine-based computing
environment, which is transparent to the monitored system. The monitor is isolated from
themonitored system, since it observes the state of themonitored system from the outside.
This method brings two benefits: detecting file operations in real time and being invisible
to malicious attackers in the monitored system. Furthermore, a kind of file classification
algorithm based on file security level is proposed to improve efficiency in this paper. The
proposed file integrity monitoring method is implemented in the full-virtualization mode
supported by the Xen platform. The experimental results show that the method is effective
with acceptable overhead.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
One of the fundamental goals of computer security is to ensure the integrity of system resources [1]. A large number of
safe accidents result from critical files modified in the system. The attackers intrude into the computer system, and hide
their traces by tampering critical files, such as executable files and system logs. File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) is one of the
most popular approaches to observe hostile behaviors, such asmodifying system log, appending backdoors, inserting Trojan
horses.
In order to avoid serious damage to the system, it is necessary to observe malicious behaviors in the system. Current FIM
can be classified into two types: Periodic FIM (PFIM) and Real-time FIM (RFIM). PFIM tools compare current attributes of
the files with previously gathered, for example, the owner, the content, and the last modification time. Tripwire [1] gives a
snapshot of the protected files firstly, and the administrator can verify their integrity periodically. Trusted PlatformModule
(TPM) provides integrity authentication for a trusted path (BIOS, boot sector, OS kernel, applications) during the starting
procedure of the system. It is difficult to be compromised by attackers because the trust chain is extended from the hardware.
PFIM verifies the integrity of the system at one ‘‘point’’, rather than during the whole ‘‘process’’. RFIM tool works in the OS
kernel to intercept file operations during the execution process of the system. XenFIT [2] is a real-time integrity monitor
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on the well-known Xen virtualization platform [3–5]. It puts several hooks into the kernel of the monitored system, and
intercepts system calls related with these file operations. In order to monitor file operation in real time, a kernel module
must be inserted in the monitored system. However, this module is easily attacked or masked by rootkits.
So, perfect FIM tool should satisfy the following requirements:
(1) Attack resistant: FIM tool should continue working even if the monitored system is completely controlled by malicious
software (malware). In XenFIT, the system call interception module runs in the monitored system, it may be disabled by
malware.
(2) Real time: FIM tool should get enough information in real time when configuration or executable files are modified by
malicious intruders. Tripwire can check the integrity of files periodically, and TPMcanmeasure any file during the system
boots, but they cannot ensure the file security during the entire runtime of the system. Furthermore, the administrator
does not know when the system begins to be unreliable, and which users tamper critical files.
(3) Transparence: FIM tool should neither modify the monitored system, nor insert any kernel module. XenFIT inserts
multiple breakpoints in the monitored system, which restricts the practicability of the monitor. There are various
monitored systems, for example, different types of OSes, diverse versions of the same class.
Virtualization technology gives people a novel approach to meet these requirements mentioned above. It provides the
isolation between FIM tools and malwares, and an advanced FIM design based on such technology is feasible. From the
report of IDC [6], virtualization [7–9] becomes an integral part of the IT infrastructure, and the virtualization servicesmarket
will grow sharply in the future 5 years. Virtualization decouples OS with the underlying hardware, and supports multiple
OS instances on the single hardware platform. An OS instance and its upper applications are encapsulated as a Virtual
Machine [8](VM). The core component of virtualization is Virtual Machine Monitor [9](VMM), which is a ‘‘thin’’ software
layer located under the traditional OS. The VMM owns full domination of the underlying hardware, and it can monitor all
events happened in the VM. At present, the design tendency of security systems in virtualization environment is to pull the
monitor tool out of the Monitored VM (MVM) and deploy it in another protected VM. Under the virtualization architecture,
FIM tools need to observe the file changes on themonitored VM, and prevent possible attacks from the VM at the same time.
The monitoring points are moved from the monitored system to the VMM, and cannot be sensed by the monitored system.
In this paper, we present a guest-transparent RFIM method in virtual computing environment. Intercepting file
operations is implemented in the VMM, and it is no need to append any module in the monitored system. The RFIM tool
locates in another Privileged VM (PVM), and observes file operations in the MVM. We can obtain enough file information,
including process identity, file name, file operation, time et al., when one critical file is modified in the MVM. The RFIM tool
is isolated from the MVM and transparent to the MVM. All files are classified into three categories based on the file security
level. The file classification algorithm is proposed to take different actions on the files which belong to different sets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the related work and background. Section 3 proposes
the RFIM method in the virtual computing environment and discuss file classification according to the significance level.
Section 4 describes the implementation of RFIM in an intrusion prevention system, named VMFence [10], based on the Xen
platform. The experiments on Xen are described in Section 5. Conclusions and future work are presented in Section 6.
2. Related work
File integrity monitoring is one function of Host-based Intrusion Detection System [11] (HIDS), and it is used for the
administrator to discover malicious behaviors. In this section, we introduce PFIM and RFIM respectively.
Tripwire [1] is a representative example of PFIM. There are fourmodes in Tripwire: init, check, update, and test. In initmode,
the significant files are specified by the administrator, and Tripwire gives a snapshot of these files. The administrator can
verify whether these files are tampered in checkmode. Tripwire compares the current hash values of files with the previous
values stored in a specified database. The problem of Tripwire is the selection of inspection cycle. If the cycle is too short,
frequent inspection will impact on the system performance, otherwise, it cannot detect the variation in time. In addition,
Tripwire executes on the monitored system, and is easily disabled by intruders with the administrator privilege. Except for
Tripwire, AIDE and Samhain are the similar tools. Pennington et al. [12] proposed a storage-based intrusion detection system
which allows the storage systems to watch data modification. This project implements file integrity monitoring when file
modification happens on a file server in the distributed environment.
I3FS [13] intercepts system calls and injects its integrity checking operations in the kernel mode. It performs checksum
comparison in the critical path. XenFIT is a file integrity monitor which is implemented on Xen. The breakpoints are inserted
in themonitored system, and intercept these system calls about file operations, for example, open, close, andwrite. It records
the system call log, and sends it to the PVM. However, It is necessary to put an intercepting system call module in the MVM.
With the emergence of multi-core processor, virtualization technology is widely applied to various aspects of computer
systems. VM-based security [14,15] becomes important increasingly. The isolation provided by VMM enhances the security
of the detector, while brings a new problem, semantic gap simultaneously.
Virtual Machine Introspection [16,17] (VMI) was firstly proposed by Tal Garfinkel and Mendel Rosenblum in the project,
Livewire [16], which is a new architecture for building an intrusion detection systemwith the merits of both high resistance
and excellent visibility via VMI. VMI is an effective method to enhance system security including intrusion detection [18],
malware detection [19,20], and honeypot [21–23]. VMwatcher [24] exports the resources in the MVM to the trusted host
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(a) The traditional RFIM
method.
(b) The proposed RFIM method.
Fig. 1. A comparison between traditional RFIM method and the proposed RFIM method.
environment, and carries out malware detection through anti-virus tools deployed on the host. It has implemented out-
of-box detection and avoided these anti-virus tools under attack. Observing the sequences of system calls in a VM, and
watching the behavior of processes are the remarkable characters of VMscope [25]. It provides a novel means to analyze
malicious processes through honeypot. Lares [26] is an architecture for secure active monitoring using virtualization. The
hooks are deployed in a untrusted guest VM, and they are protected by the VMM. Xenaccess [27] is an open source VMI
library on Xen. It provides a convenient interface for programmers by encapsulating libxc and libblktap. It is a library to
observe the states of another VM, but the functions must be implemented by users. On February 2008, VMware has released
a VMI library, VMsafe, which provides an application program interface for other security manufacturers to improve the
security of the VMM, for example, Symantec,McAfee etc.
For current FIM methods, the monitoring tools are easily destroyed by malicious attacks. On the other hand, current
VM-based security systems do not provide the FIM function. Our paper aims to design and implement a real-time and
guest-transparent FIM approach using virtualization technology.
3. Real-time integrity monitoring
3.1. Guest-transparent real-time integrity monitoring architecture
For most of the rootkits, they are installed into the system, andmodify the critical file (/usr/bin/{ls, ps}) to hide their trace.
Current monitoring methods intercept these system calls in the target system, and the rootkits can mask them without
difficulty. However, the approach proposed in this paper puts themonitoring point in the VMM layer, which is isolated from
the attacker. It has the real view about the target system with the function of semantic reconstruction.
Fig. 1 shows the difference between traditional RFIM method and our method. In order to monitor file modification,
traditional RFIM tool is deployed as a kernel module. It inserts several hooks to intercept read and write system calls. That
is, the traditional RFIM tool resides on the monitored system. While in our method, the monitor locates in a privileged VM,
which is out of the range of intruder. There is no need to insert any additional module into the monitored VM, which is
completely transparent to attackers.
An obstacle for VM monitoring is the semantic gap between applications in MVM and VMM. Semantic reconstruction is
introduced to eliminate the gap. Current VMI library is inadequate for file integrity analysis. For example, Xenaccess tracks
four operations: file creation and deletion, and directory creation and deletion. In order to obtain detailed file information,
the system call sensor must be deployed in the VMM, which is a minor modification to the monitor and can help to get total
information such as user identity, process identity, file name, operation time etc.
For our non-intrusive method, three basic components located at different levels are described as follows:
(1) System call sensor in the VMM: In order tomonitor file operations in real time, thismodule captures system calls about file
operations, such as create, andwrite. In theVMM level, itmonitors all events occurred in eachVM.When an application in
the MVM invokes a system call, the execution flow is trapped into the VMM. This module parses system call parameters
about file operations. After that, it will inform the event notification module in the PVM.
(2) Event notification in kernel mode: It transfers system call parameters and provides the interface for the monitor in the
PVM. It is a bridge between the system call sensor and the monitor.
(3) Real-timemonitor in usermode: Thismodule implements the key function of RFIM. It obtains parameters and responds to
filemodification, when system calls are acting on the protected file set. According to the system traces, files are classified
into three types: significant, sensitive and ordinary.
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(a) The format of specified files. (b) The usage frequency of
commands.
Fig. 2. The input of file classification algorithm.
3.2. File classification algorithm
In traditional OS, file attributes contains distinct privilege of different users (owner, group, and other), such as readable
(r), writable (w) and executable (e), which can prevent unauthentic access in a way. But this permission is invalid to the
administrator, root in Linux. The administrator can access all files without any limitation. Therefore, if an attacker steals
the administrator privilege by buffer overflow, he can cause serious damage on the target file. Normally, files have various
security level in system. In order to quantify file security level, the weight of file i is defined as follows:
wi = α ∗ fi + β ∗ di (α + β = 1). (1)
wi represents theweighted value of file i, fi denotes the access frequency of file i, and di illuminates the significance of the
directory which file i belongs to. For example, the directory for /usr/sbin/useradd is /usr/sbin, rather than /usr. The largerwi is,
the more important the file is. The tuning variables, α and β , represent the proportion of the frequency and the significance
of directory respectively and the sum of α and β is equal to 1.
file i ∈
{ssig ifw ∈ [tsig, 1]
ssen ifw ∈ [tsen, tsig)
sord ifw ∈ [0, tsen).
(2)
In this paper, we define two threshold values for significant file and sensitive file: tsig and tsen. If wi is larger than the
threshold values, file i belongs to the corresponding set (ssig or ssen). Otherwise, file i belongs to sord. The set which file i
belongs to is defined as follows:
(1) Significant file: The user can read or execute this file, but it cannot be modified by any users, including root in Linux.
In other words, the file is modification-forbidden for all users after system installation in the MVM. In Linux, some
executable files are used to display the system state, such as processes (/bin/ps), files (/bin/ls), network connections
(/bin/netstat). If these executable files have been tampered or replaced, the intruder can hide their malicious behavior.
In the case of defenders, it is hard for them to discover the intruder’s trace. When significant files are modified in the
MVM, the monitor in the PVM should detect this malicious action and prevent any damage on the files.
(2) Sensitive file: The user can modify this file, but the operations must be recorded in the system log. In Linux, all
configuration files locate under the directory /etc. For example, /etc/profile defines the shell environment after the users
login. Anymodification on software configurationmay influence the system behavior. The intruders, who expect to gain
private information, should destroy the system by modifying this file. It is necessary to log all things happened in the
MVM for future analysis. The log recorder is isolated with the MVM to enhance the security of the monitor.
(3) Ordinary file: Other files except for significant and sensitive files, including temporary or inessential files. All file
operations on these files are frequent, and the monitor does not need to monitor these files. For example, directory
/tmp in Linux keeps the temporary data during process execution. All operations on these files are ignored, and are not
recorded in the log file.
The target of file classification is to take different actions for files which belong to different sets. All files in ssig are write-
forbidden for all users. All operations on the files in ssen are logged in the PVM. The administrator should define the minimal
ssig and ssen for the performance consideration. The more the files need to be protected, the longer the monitor spends.
The administrator can initialize the file sets at the beginning, and some files are appended into these sets according to the
command log. dsig represents the set of significant directories, and dsen represents the set of sensitive directories. They are
defined by the administrator. File classification algorithm demonstrates how to determine ssig and ssen. At the beginning, set
ssig and ssen are empty. The administrator defines significant files and sensitive files, and appends them to the above two sets.
According to the file access frequency, the weighted values of the above files are calculated. When the weighted valuewi of
an executable file exceeds the threshold value, tsig or tsen, it belongs to the corresponding set, ssig or ssen.
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4. RFIM implementation in VMFence
In this section, we firstly introduce a network-based intrusion prevention system in virtual computing environment,
namedVMFence.VMFence is a network-based intrusionprevention system in the distributed virtual computing environment,
implemented in our previous work. Multiple VMs with different services run on the same platform. The PVM can monitor
all network flow from or to the MVM, consequently all detections can be done in the PVM. Due to different requirements of
service type and file security level, the administrator can configure detection rules for each VM. The detection components
for all VMs can run in parallel to improve the detection efficiency, especially on the multi-core platform. When the MVM is
migrated to another physical node, the detection rulesmust be transferred to the destination node. In addition, the detection
process reboots on the destination platform according to these detection rules.
In VMFence, RFIMmethod aims to defendmaliciousmodifications on the file in real time. In order to implement the RFIM
method, the environment must satisfy the following two requirements:
(1) The guest VM is unmodified, which provides the transparence to the applications in the MVM. There is no need to insert
any module in the kernel of the MVM.
(2) System calls can be intercepted in the VMM in real time. In order to implement the RFIM method, all system calls must
be sensed in the VMM layer, and only these relevant to file operations are selected for further analysis.
The reason why we choose Xen as the VMM is for stability and high efficiency. We just take Xen for an example, and the
same idea can be implemented on other virtualization platforms, such as VMware, QEMU [28]. On the Xen platform, a VM
is called one domain. The privileged domain is called Domain0, which controls and manages other unprivileged domains
named DomainU. Xen supports two different VM types: para-virtualization and full-virtualization. Guest operating systems
need to be modified under para-virtualization for high performance, while guest operating systems run on Xenwithout any
modification under full-virtualization with the help of hardware virtualization extension. Full-virtualization DomainU must
get support from CPU, such as Intel VT [29,30] or AMD SVM [31].
4.1. Definition of file set
The file sets (ssig and ssen) are determined by the administrator and the command log. The administrator specifies the file
sets in the form of XML. Fig. 2(a) gives an example of the file sets which are specified by the administrator. From this figure,
the two sets are initialized by the administrator as ssig = {/bin/ls, /bin/ps, /bin/netstat}, ssen = {/bins/sh, /sbin/init}.
In addition, files can be appended to the sets dynamically. If file i is not specified by the administrator, its weighted value
is calculated according to formula (1). The weighted value of file i is decided by its usage frequency and the directory which
it belongs to. We take the above calculation approach on Linux as an example. Without loss of generality, α and β are set to
0.5, which indicate the two parts have the same significance.
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Fig. 3. The execution flow of RFIM.
First of all, we must get the frequency of each command for certain user. Considering root in Linux as an example,
the command history which the user invokes is stored in .bash_profile under the user’s home directory. The usage
frequency of each command is acquired by the underlying shell code: history | awk ‘{CMD [$2]++; count++;}
END{for (a in CMD) print CMD[a] ‘‘ ’’ CMD[a]/count ∗ 100 ‘‘%’’ a;}’ | grep-v ‘‘./’’ | column -c3 -s‘‘ ’’ -t | sort -nr | nl. We
record the command usage in one day. Fig. 2(b) outputs the statistical results of each command.
If file i belongs to dsig = {/sbin, /usr/sbin, /usr/local/sbin}, we set di = 1. The commands executed on files in dsig
by the administrator can change the system’s state. And if file i belongs to dsen = {/bin, /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin}, we set
di = 0.5. The commands can be executed on files in dsen by any user. If file i belongs to none of them, we set di = 0. As
ls is specified by the administrator, it is no need to calculate its weighted value. The weighted value of cat is calculated as
follows: cat belongs to the directory /bin (dsen), and di = 0.5, and the usage frequency of cat is 0.1667, so the weighted value
wcat = 0.5 ∗ 0.1667+ 0.5 ∗ 0.5 = 0.33. The calculation for other files are similar to this.
According to the discussion above,we set the threshold values of ssig and ssen: tsig = 0.3, and tsen = 0.25. At last, these sets
are: ssig = {/bin/ls, /bin/ps, /bin/netstat, /bin/cat, /sbin/ifconfig}, ssen = {/bin/sh, /sbin/init, /usr/bin/vim, /usr/bin/
make}. The other files in the system belong to sord.
4.2. Guest-transparent monitoring using hardware virtualization
Based on hardware virtualization, our prototype is transparent to the MVM. Although hardware virtualization is related
to CPU type, there are few differences between Intel VT and AMD SVM, especially the instructions about virtualization and
their usage. We select Intel VT due to its broad market and detailed documentation.
Intel CPU with VT, which supports instructions about virtualization [30] (VMXON, VMLAUNCH etc.), provides two
processor modes: root mode and non-root mode. Xen runs in root mode, and each full-virtualization VM runs in non-
root mode. When special events (such as privilege instructions, external interrupts, and page faults etc.) happen in a full-
virtualizationVM, theywill trigger the transition from non-rootmode to rootmode (VMExit). The states of guest OS (registers
and context) within the VM are stored in the VMCS region, which is maintained by the VMM. After that, the VMM judges
the reasons of VMExit, and executes the corresponding handler. After the VMM handles with the events, CPU resumes the
execution flow of Guest OS. At the same time, the processor transforms from root mode to non-root mode (VMEntry).
In Linux, system call is the interface between user mode (ring 3) and kernel mode (ring 0), and there are two different
implementation methods of system calls. The first one is through software interrupt (int $0x80) [32]. When one process
in user mode invokes a system call, the kernel checks its privilege and input parameters. The transition process from user
mode to kernel mode is time-consuming. Therefore, fast system call (sysenter) provides a quick transition method from
user mode to kernel mode. Because there is no privilege inspection and stack operation, its execution speed is faster than
int $0x80. At present, fast system call is applied in Linux 2.6. The related registers (SYSENTER_CS_MSR, SYSENTER_EIP_MSR,
SYSENTER_ESP_MSR) must be prepared before instruction sysenter executes. Register SYSENTER_EIP_MSR indicates the entry
point of function sysenter_entry.
Fig. 3 explains the relationship among function calls in RFIM. Library libxc is a user-space (ring 3) interface which invokes
hypercall. In the implementation of RFIM, we operate on library libxc. The value of SYSENTER_EIP_MSR is modified when the
monitor runs. The basic mechanism of system call interception is to trigger page fault at each time of system call invocation.
When an application invokes a system call, page fault happens if the entry address does not exist. Page faults lead to ‘‘trap’’
into the VMM, and the system call sensor can implement system call interception. The abovemethodwill increase the usage
frequency of VMExit, which is the overhead brought by RFIM. However, VMExit is very frequent (close to 100,000 times per
second) during full-virtualization VM execution, and the performance effect can be tolerable via the experiments discussed
in Fig. 3.
Algorithm 2 shows the execution procedure of RFIM. fsyscall represents a file which the current system call operates on.
When the administrator plans to monitor the integrity of certain VM, ssig and ssen are decided by file classification algorithm
in Section 3.2. The RFIM tool in user mode will invoke libxc library to reset an inexistent value (inexist_addr) into register
SYSENTER_EIP_MSR, and the original value (saved_addr) is stored by the VMM. When VMExit happens, and if it is caused by
page fault, the system call sensor module checks the address. If page-fault linear address (pfl_addr) equals to the inexistent
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Fig. 4. The thread_info structure instance.
value (inexist_addr), it represents that a system call is invoked. The system calls about file modifications are selected, and
their parameters are parsed (file name, process identification etc.). ssyscall defines all system calls about file modifications in
Linux 2.6.18.8 (write, open, create, link, unlink,mknod, chmod, utime, rename,mkdir, rmdir, truncate, ftruncate,writev, chown).
If the file belongs to ssig, the operation fails. If the file belongs to ssen, this operation is recorded in the database. Otherwise,
there is nothing to do. After the VM resumes, the original entry point of the system call handler is assigned to EIP. After
VMEntry happens, the system call handler executes in the VM.
4.3. Semantic reconstruction
When a system call is invoked by an executive program, page fault happens and CPU traps into root mode. In the VMM
level, Xen can access all pages of guest system, but the information in the pages has no semantic to Xen. Therefore, it is
necessary to reconstruct the semantic of the information expressed in low level.
If page fault is caused by system call according to Algorithm 2, the control flow turns to Xen. At the same time, the
registers and context of the MVM are saved in VMCS. When system calls happen in the MVM, register EAX stores the system
call number, and the corresponding arguments are held in other registers (EBX, ECX, EDX, ESI, EDI). There are some system
calls with file name, such as open. The full path of file manipulated by system call consists of an argument and current
directory. However, there are existing system calls with file descriptor as the arguments, such as read,write. Getting the full
path according to file descriptor is the most difficult.
Kernel stack and thread_info structure share 2 pages in Linux. The thread_info locates in lower address, while the kernel
stack locates in higher address. That is, if the page size is 4 kB, the thread_info structure aligns to 8 kB (213) and the lower
13 bit is set to zero. Fig. 4 gives an example of thread_info structure and kernel stack. The current position of kernel stack is
denoted by ESP register, which can be acquired from VMCS. Based on the discussion above, the initial address of thread_info
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Fig. 5. Get file name from register ESP.
Fig. 6. The task_struct structure.
structure can be calculated by masking the lower 13 bits of register ESP, ESP & (∼(213 − 1)). By this way, the pointer of
thread_info structure is reconstructed.
Fig. 5 shows the searching process from register ESP. Taking write system call, write(fd, ‘‘test ’’, sizeof (‘‘test ’’)), as an
example: When one application in the MVM launches this system call, it trap into Xen, and the state of this VM is saved
in the VMCS region. The system call number of write is 4, which is saved in register EAX, and the related arguments are
stored in EBX, ECX, EDX in turn. We get the start address of structure thread_info via register ESP, and one member of the
structure points to structure task_struct. Structure task_struct contains the process state information which is described in
Fig. 6, such as process identity (pid), process name (comm), user identity (uid), open file information (files_struct). Structure
files_struct includes the files information used by the current process, and structure fdtable is one of its member. Structure
fdtable contains the current file descriptor table. Due to fd in register EBX, structure file describing current file, contains
structure dentry, representing file entry. From structure dentry, we can get the short path name, and the full path name can
be gotten with its member d_parent by recursion.
5. Experiments
In this section, we present the experiments to validate the efficiency of our method. RFIM in VMFence is implemented
on Xen 3.2.0. In order to deploy a full-virtualization guest VM, the hardware, especially CPU, must support hardware
virtualization extension. The physical platform is two Pentium Quad-Core processors, 4 GB of memory, and 160 GB of disk
capacity. Fedora 8 is preinstalled on the hardware platform, and Xen 3.2.0 with modification is compiled and installed on it.
We chose Ubuntu 8.04 as the guest OS in the full-virtualization VM, that is the MVM. The configuration of the MVM is one
virtual CPU and 256 MB memory.
Our system assumes that the VMM layer can isolate the privileged VM from the monitored VM, which is the
essential function of virtualization software. This is necessary and reasonable requirement for virtualization-based security
technology. Other two preconditions are hardware-based virtualization and fast system call.
(1) Hardware-based virtualization: In order to support full-virtualization VM, there are two different methods: binary
translation and hardware virtualization. Binary translation captures these privilege instructions and simulates them
in the VMM layer, such as QEMU, VMware. Hardware virtualization implements the same function via hardware, which
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Table 1
The comparison of LARES, XenFIT and RFIM method.
Aspect LARES XenFIT RFIM method
Sensor location The monitored system The monitored system VMM
Transparence No No Yes
Isolation General Poor Excellent
Real time Yes Yes Yes
Table 2
The performance of file compression and decompression.
Operation Native time (s) RFIM time (s) Overhead (%)
Compression 203 229 12.8
Decompression 56 62 10.7
Table 3
The performance of encryption and decryption.
Native time (s) RFIM time (s) Overhead (%)
Encryption 58 69 18.9
Decryption 31 37 19.4
has better performance. Hardware-based virtualization is supported by the familiar multi-core CPU, and it is the notable
characteristic of current CPU.
(2) Fast system call: Traditional system call is implemented by software interrupt. The switch between user mode and
kernel mode consumes hundreds of cycles, and it happens frequently during system execution. Therefore, fall system
call has obvious performance advantage comparedwith traditional system call. Intel x86 CPU supported fast system call
instructions (SYSENTER/SYSEXIT ) since PII 300. At present, all mainstream OSes for x86 platform support system call.
Windows XP adopts fast system call, but Linux supports both traditional system call and fast system call at the same
time. If guest OS is Windows XP, this method will be effective all the time. If fast system call is masked by malicious
attackers in Linux, the system applies traditional system call by default.
5.1. Effectiveness
We compare three systems with similar functions, including LARES, XenFIT and RFIM method. Table 1 shows the
comparison results on four aspects: sensor location, transparence, isolation, and real time. Both LARES and XenFIT deploy
sensors in themonitored system, and intercept system calls. Although LARES protects these pages containing hook functions,
it loses the transparency to the guest OS. Our method deploys the monitoring point in the VMM, and is full transparent to
the monitored system.
Fig. 7 illustrates the control interface of our system running in the privileged VM. It provides the configuration interface
for the administrator, and outputs the monitoring results, such as operation, file, user identity, process identity. In order to
verify the effectiveness of our prototype in VMFence, the rootkit is installed after the monitor is booted. The two file sets
(ssig and ssen) have been determined in Section 3.2, and /sbin/init belongs to ssen.Mood-NT [33] is a kernel rootkit on Linux. It
intercepts the system call table, and replaces /sbin/init to hide files, processes and network connections. During the system
execution,Mood-NT is installed to test our prototype.
Fig. 8 shows the detailed information when sensitive files are changed in theMVM. This report includes themodification
time (Time), the file name (File), the system call (Syscall), process identification (PID), user identification (UID), group
identification (GID). T0rn [34] is a Linux user mode rootkit. It can modify the applications which observe the system state,
such as ls, ps, netstat. In our implementation, these applications have been appended to ssig, and this type of attacks can be
prevented.
5.2. Performance analysis
In this section, the system performance is evaluated on full-virtualization Ubuntu 8.04. As file compression and
decompression are two common functions for file system,wemeasure the efficiency of file compression and decompression
using Linux kernel source. The size of linux-2.6.18.8.tar.gz is about 50 MB. We test it on two conditions: one without RFIM
(Native), and the other with RFIM (RFIM). The time (seconds) in these two conditions are demonstrated in Table 2. The
compression time is far larger than the decompression time. The overhead brought by the RFIM method is less than 13%.
Afterward, we test the performance of file encryption and decryption and Linux kernel source (linux-2.6.18.8.tar.gz) is
taken as test case. Table 3 shows the results of our experiment. The overhead brought by the RFIMmethod is less than 20%.
iozone is a professional benchmark for file system, which is widely accepted and applied. The command we use is iozone
-a -i 0 -i 1 -n 8K -g 128m. It indicates that only the efficiency of file reading and writing will be tested. The minimal file
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Fig. 7. Console of RFIM system.
Fig. 8. Report when sensitive files are modified.
Fig. 9. The performance of iozone.
size is 8 kB, and the largest file size is 128 MB. The file size we chose is 16 MB. We focus on both file reading and writing
operations, and Fig. 9 shows the speed of file reading and writing when the block size varies from 4 kB to 16,384 kB. The
horizontal axis represents the block size (kB), and the vertical axis represents the reading or writing speed (kB per second).
The writing speed is almost half of the reading speed. When the block size increases from 4 kB to 16,384 kB, the overall
efficiency improves gradually. According to all conditions from Fig. 9, we can know that the reading and writing detection
overhead under the RFIMmethod is a little heavier than the one under native. When the file block size is larger than 128 kB,
the performance overhead brought by the RFIM method is less than 15%.
6. Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have presented a RFIM approach in VMFence, which has themerits of strong isolation, transparence, and
real time. It does not modify the MVM, and brings acceptable overhead. The files in the MVM are classified into three types:
significant, sensitive, and ordinary. The sets are determined by our proposed file classification algorithm. In this paper, the
read-forbidden policy is not applied in our design, and the reason is that encryption can achieve this goal better. In Linux,
the user’s home directory and shell environment are set according to /etc/passwd when the user tries to login the system.
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The user’s password is stored by encryption in /etc/shadow. Themost privileged user, root in Linux, can change file attributes
arbitrarily, so that it is meaningless to set read-forbidden policy for root.
Xenaccess can implement FIM without modifying the MVM, but it cannot fetch the detailed information in real time,
especially filewriting operation. The reason is that filewriting operation is optimized byOS in theMVM.Wewill improve our
method for better performance. The next step of VMFence is to build an Intrusion Tolerance System (ITS) in virtual computing
environment. We focus on the security challenges brought by virtualization technology. Until now, we have implemented
prevention from the attacks on the network and file system. In our futurework, wewill aim atmalware detection, especially
attacks to VMM, such as VM escape and subverting VMM.
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